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The Conflict in Iraq and its Impact on Perception toward Statehood:
Based on Poll Surveys

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Introduction

Iraq faced a major regime change in 2003. The U.S. invasion of Iraq ended the Ba'thist regime led by Saddam Hussein at the time. The U.S. led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) purged the executive members of the Ba'th Party and dissolved all security apparatus, such as armies and polices. Subsequently, Shi'ite Islamic parties took control of the regime through elections.

The introduction of elections brought about an expansion of violence all over the country. Radical Islamist groups such as al-Qaida rushed into Iraq where they could fight against the U.S. In addition, the purged party's former executive members and former military professionals joined their war against the U.S., as well as against the newly formed Iraqi regime. This ended in a deadly civil war that killed several thousand Iraqis every month. Subsequently, the U.S. insurgency and local tribe-based vigilante group, Awakening Council, successfully restored public order.

Nonetheless, the security situation deteriorated after the so-called Arab Spring at the end of 2011. The self-styled Islamic State (IS) returned to Iraq from Syria and occupied its second-largest city, Mosul, in June 2014. As a result of this, it is widely believed that sectarian conflict intensified, as did antipathy toward the former regime's supporters. Sectarian conflict intensified due to the IS's claim of having killed Shi'ites. Because of this, various Shi'ite militia groups became mobilized in order to protect their community. The former regime began to be viewed more negatively after the rise of IS, as it was the purged former regime members who made a strategic alliance with the IS. Most of these executives were professional soldiers of the former Iraqi army.

So far, widespread sectarian conflict and antipathy toward the former regime were commonly accepted impacts of the IS. However, no academic research has been conducted on the impact of the IS on the opinions of the people of Iraq. What kind of impact did the IS bring about to Iraqi politics as well as in the Iraqi perception toward statehood?

Thus, this paper aims to clarify the impacts of the conflicts in Iraq, brought about by the IS, by analysing survey data.

Section I outlines the Iraqi political process in the post-war era and presents two commonly accepted impacts of the IS, namely sectarianism and antipathy toward the former regime. Section II explains the data set used in this paper. Section III confirms the two impacts on Iraqi perspective with the help of the descriptive statistics of the 2017 survey. Consequently, section IV analyses whether these two impacts can be understood as the impacts of the IS, using the two regressions of the pooled data set of the four poll surveys conducted in Iraq.

I.   Overview of Iraqi Politics

After the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, the most important policies that the U.S.-led CPA introduced were the dissolution of all Iraqi armies and the so-called 'De-Ba'thification' policy that purged executive members of the Ba'th Party. These two policies caused a number of problems in the process of state building.

First, the policies caused the unemployment of around 600,000 people who had supported state organizations as public officers, police officers, or military officers [Stover et al 2005; Stansfiled 2007]. When they lost their jobs, they became critical of both the U.S. policy and the newly formed Iraqi government. Second, frustrated with the policies, those who were purged, formed alliances with illegal opposition groups/radical jihadists, such as al-Qaida, at the beginning and with the IS later on. Third, the policies created a critical juncture for establishing sectarian conflict in Iraqi society. This is because the De-Ba'thification policy was continued in a radical manner under the new Shi'ite Islamist regime that was formed through elections. To put it simply, the Shi'ite Islamists had been in exile under the former regime, and therefore the supporters of the former regime were considered to be enemies by them and were to be excluded from the building of the new state[1]. This purge policy resulted in a conflict between Sunni and Shi'ite Iraqis, as many of the executive members of the former regime happened to be Sunni and the majority of the new regime were Shi'a. All these factors, along with the introduction of the electoral process, resulted in bringing Iraq to a civil war.

Security conditions improved after the U.S.'s initiation of counter insurgency and the formation of the local tribe-based vigilante group, Awakening Council[2]. However, after the Arab Uprising at the end of 2011, the security situation in Iraq drastically worsened with the return of the IS from Syria, who occupied the second-largest city, Mosul, in June 2014. The purged ruling class of the former regime, most of whom were

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[1] Needless to say, this sentence can be criticized as oversimplification. For details on this criticism, see [Yamao 2013]

[2] For details on the Awakening Council, see [Yamao 2012].

soldiers of the former Iraqi army, made a temporary strategic alliance with the IS during this process.

It is well known that the IS claimed to have killed the Shia as they virtuously considered them to be *kāfirs* (unbelievers). Against this claim, a large number of Shi'ite militia groups mobilized and formed the Popular Mobilization Unit (al-Ḥashd al-Shaʿbī, PMU) in order to protect the Shi'ite community. In the process, sectarian conflict between the Sunni and Shia intensified. Moreover, negative opinions about supporters of the former regime is considered to be increased as they formed alliances with the IS to occupy various cities, such as Mosul[3]. Regrettably, since the members of the IS and most of the purged former regime executives were Sunni, and most of the PMU were Shia, sectarian conflict was further mobilized. Foreign intervention by Saudi Arabia, who indirectly supported the former, and by Iran, who openly supported the latter, further provoked this sectarian conflict.

The overview of the above-mentioned political process led to two important observations: First, the rise of the IS brought about serious sectarian tension and sectarian conflict among Iraqis, because the IS agitated sectarian conflict and the PMU responded to it. Second, the rise of the IS brought about a critically negative perception toward the supporters of the former regime, because they made strategic alliances with the IS[4]. Therefore, the question arises: Are these assumptions valid?

II. Data Set

In order to examine the suitability of these assumptions and to check whether these assumptions are accepted by ordinary Iraqis, this paper uses the data of poll surveys conducted in Iraq by my research team and I.

The first data is that of a 2017 poll survey conducted in Iraq. This survey was conducted as a part of the research project, 'Relational Studies on Global Crises'. We conducted an opinion poll in Iraq during June to September 2017 in order to grasp how Iraqi people perceive statehood and the socio-political and economic situation in the post-conflict society. The questionnaire used was similar to that used in Syria, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, and was developed by the researchers of Group B02 'Cross-border Non-State Networks' [Yamao 2019]. The survey was conducted using a two-stage stratified random sampling, detailing the percentage of the prefecture and the percentage of the

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[3] A large number of criticism and negative attitude/ antipathy could be observed in Iraqi media as to the alliance between the IS and former regime supporters [Masala 2 Jul 2014].

[4] For the two assumptions and the IS impact on the Iraqi socio-political situation, see [Eriksson and Khaleel eds. 2018].

ethnic/sectarian groups. The details of the sampling are shown in Figures 1 and 2[5].

In this paper, I will use the data set in order to verify the above-mentioned assumptions – the spread of sectarian conflict and the negative perception toward the supporters of the former regime – observed in the post-IS era of Iraq. I will tackle this issue in section III.

【Figure 1: Sample Size in the 2017 Poll】

	Prefecture	Sample Size	% of Total Sample	Target Population	% of Total Population
Kurd majority	Dohuk	n.d	n.d	1252343	3.39
	Irbil	70	7	1797708	4.87
	Sulaymaniya	70	7	2095851	5.67
Sunni majority (mixed)	Ninawa	n.d	n.d	3612339	9.78
	Kirkuk	50	5	1548212	4.19
	Salah al-Din	70	7	1544081	4.18
	Diyala	60	6	1584948	4.2
	Anbar	80	8	1715149	4.6
Shia majority	Baghdad	380	38	7877888	21.33
	Babil	n.d	n.d	1999034	5.41
	Wasit	n.d	n.d	1335230	3.62
	Karbala	n.d	n.d	1180545	3.20
	Najaf	80	8	1425723	3.86
	Qadisiya	n.d	n.d	1250166	3.38
	Maysan	n.d	n.d	1078086	2.92
	Dhi Qar	n.d	n.d	2029345	5.49
	Muthanna	n.d	n.d	788262	2.13
	Basra	140	14	2818804	7.63
	Total	1000	100.00	36933714	100.00

Source: Target population is cited by estimated population in 2015, available the website of the Iraqi Ministry of Planning (http://www.cosit.gov.iq/ar/).

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[5] For the details of the sampling method, questionnaire, result, and descriptive statistics, see [Yamao 2019].

【Figure 2: Sample size by ethnic/sectarian groups】

		Ethnic/Sectarian Groups						Total
		Sunni Arab	Shi'ite Arab	Christian	Kurd	Others	Refused	
Irbil	Size	1	0	6	54	9	0	70
	%	1.4	0.0	8.6	77.1	12.9	0.0	100
Sulaymaniya	Size	0	0	0	66	0	4	70
	%	0.0	0.0	0.0	94.3	0.0	5.7	100
Kirkuk	Size	10	10	0	10	20	0	50
	%	20.0	20.0	0.0	20.0	40.0	0.0	100
Salah al-Din	Size	57	0	0	0	3	10	70
	%	81.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.3	14.3	100
Diyala	Size	22	25	0	0	0	13	60
	%	36.7	41.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	21.7	100
Anbar	Size	57	2	1	1	1	18	80
	%	71.2	2.5	1.2	1.2	1.2	22.5	100
Baghdad	Size	106	257	3	8	6	0	380
	%	27.9	67.6	0.8	2.1	1.6	0.0	100
Najaf	Size	1	78	0	0	1	0	80
	%	1.2	97.5	0.0	0.0	1.2	0.0	100
Basra	Size	8	99	0	2	31	0	140
	%	5.7	70.7	0.0	1.4	22.1	0.0	100
Total	Size	262	471	10	141	71	45	1000
	%	26.2	47.1	1.0	14.1	7.1	4.5	100

Source: Made by author.

The second data set comprises of pooled data of the poll surveys that my team and I conducted in the country, in the years 2011, 2016, 2017 (same data as mentioned above), and 2018. This data set was constructed by combining these four surveys. The IS occupied Mosul in 2014, thus the 2011 data can be understood as pre-IS era (base category). The sample size of each survey and the allocation of the sample to each ethnic/sectarian group is shown in Figure 3.

Furthermore, in order to analyse the impact of the IS, a new variable called 'Intensity of Conflict' has been added to this data set. Intensity of Conflict is recorded based on the number of casualties caused by the IS from 2014 to 2017, the period it had control in some cities in Iraq. The number of casualties are cited from the Iraq Body Count website. It provides the most reliable, well documented, and non-affiliated records of violence [Al-Tamimi 2012]. As shown in Figure 4, the larger the casualty number, the higher the conflict intensity and influence of the IS.

I will use this data set to examine whether the above-mentioned assumptions – the spread of sectarian conflict and the negative perception toward the supporters of the former regime – were impacts of the IS, or at least influenced the Iraqi society. I will tackle this issue in section VI.

【Figure 3: Sample Size by Ethnic/Sectarian Groups and Survey Year】

	Ethnic/ Sectarian Groups					Total	Survey year				I.C.
	Sunni	Shia	Kurd	others	refused		2011	2016	2017	2018	
Irbil	1	0	232	41	15	289	◯	◯	◯	◯	1
	0.3%	0.0%	80.3%	14.2%	5.2%	100.0%					
Sulaymaniya	0	0	177	0	13	190	◯		◯	◯	1
	0.0%	0.0%	93.2%	0.0%	6.8%	100.0%					
Kirkuk	33	28	45	46	3	155	◯		◯	◯	14.5
	21.3%	18.1%	29.0%	29.7%	1.9%	100.0%					
Ninawa	35	0	5	5	5	50	◯				133.1
	70.0%	0.0%	10.0%	10.0%	10.0%	100.0%					
Salah al-Din	112	33	1	4	62	212		◯	◯	◯	38.8
	52.8%	15.6%	0.5%	1.9%	29.2%	100.0%					
Diyala	46	47	33	10	64	200		◯	◯	◯	8.4
	23.0%	23.5%	16.5%	5.0%	32.0%	100.0%					
Anbar	84	2	1	2	71	160			◯	◯	52.9
	52.5%	1.3%	0.6%	1.3%	44.4%	100.0%					
Baghdad	287	744	50	67	278	1426	◯	◯	◯	◯	13.7
	20.1%	52.2%	3.5%	4.7%	19.5%	100.0%					
Najaf	2	264	0	1	9	276	◯	◯	◯	◯	1
	0.7%	95.7%	0.0%	0.4%	3.3%	100.0%					
Basra	66	311	4	2	110	493	◯	◯	◯	◯	1
	13.4%	63.1%	0.8%	0.4%	22.3%	100.0%					
Total	671	1436	551	213	630	3501	701	800	1000	1000	
	19.2%	41.0%	15.7%	6.1%	18.0%	100.0%	20.0%	22.9%	28.6%	28.6%	

Note: I.C. stands for intensity of conflict (see Figure 4).

Source: Made by author.

【Figure 4: Casualties of IS Attack and Code of the 'Intensity of Conflict'】

	Irbil	Sulym	Kirkuk	Ninawa	SD	Diyala	Anbar	Baghd	Najaf	Basra
2014	11		90	2596	2186	311	1330	160		
2015	5	4	477	4112	1165	337	3175	253		14
2016	3		801	5910	464	174	757	816		5
2017	0	0	80	695	58	19	22	137	9	0
Total	19	4	1448	13313	3873	841	5284	1366	9	19
Code	1	1	14.48	133.13	38.73	8.41	52.84	13.66	1	1

Source: Iraq Body Count (https://www.iraqbodycount.org/).

III. Sectarianism and the Antipathy toward the Former Regime

Through descriptive statistics of the 2017 poll survey data set, this section attempts to show that the above-mentioned assumptions can be observed in the post-IS era of Iraq.

【Figure 5: Greatest External Threat】

First, sectarian inclination can be clearly observed in the Iraqi perception of external threat. As shown in Figure 5, the Shi'a tend to consider Saudi Arabia, which is perceived as the leader of Sunni countries, as the greatest threat after the U.S. On the other hand, the Sunni tend to consider Iran, perceived as the leader of the Shi'a, as the greatest external threat. This reflects sectarianism.

As for the attitude toward the former regime, Figure 6 shows that the Sunni consider reconciliation with the former regime as 'very important', while the Shi'a believe otherwise. Even though around 40% of Shia consider reconciliation as 'very important/important', and a certain number of people in each group answered 'do not know', it cannot be denied that the attitude toward reconciliation with the former regime can be different among ethno-sectarian groups.

【Figure 6: Reconciliation with the Former Regime】

This difference in attitude becomes much clearer with the perception of ethno-sectarian groups toward the exclusion of the former regime. As shown in Figure 7, the Sunni show a negative attitude to the exclusion, whereas the Shia consider the exclusion to be positive. This is not surprising, considering that the Shi'ite Islamist groups had been excluded from the government in the former regime. Thus, they tend to see the former regime in a negative light. In short, sectarianism and the negative attitude toward the former regime can be observed in the post-IS period.

【Figure 7: Exclusion of the Former Regime】

Although sectarianism and the negative attitude toward the former regime can be observed, each ethno-sectarian group considers the cohesion of the people as Iraqis, as 'very important/important', as shown in Figure 8. In addition, these politically sensitive issues are not the main concern for most Iraqis. As Figure 9 shows, most Iraqis consider issues that are connected directly with their daily life, as most important, such as anti-corruption, functional government, and security.

To summarise, the descriptive statistics of the data set of the 2017 poll survey shows that our two assumptions can be observed in the post-IS era in Iraqi society.

【Figure 8: Cohesion of the People as Iraqis】

■ very important/important   ■ not important/not at all   ■ Not Know

【Figure 9: Most Important Policy】

■ most important task

IV. Impact of the IS

Thus, the question that arises, is whether these two assumptions were impacts of the IS, or were at least an influence on Iraqi society.

1. IS Impact on the Spread of Sectarian Conflict

This section first analyses how Iraqis perceive national integration overcoming sectarian conflict, before and after the rise of the IS. In other words, I will try to analyse whether the spread of sectarianism can be understood as an impact of the IS, based on the pooled data set.

The dependent variable includes the extent to which Iraqis give importance to national integration overcoming sectarian conflict. Therefore, the answer to the question, 'To what extent do Iraqis consider national integration overcoming sectarian conflict important for Iraqi politics?' is used as the variable. As this is an orderly variable (1=not at all important, 2=not important, 3=neutral, 4=important, and 5= very important), it is appropriate to apply the ordered logistic regression model in the analysis.

For the independent variable, I used an ethno-sectarian dummy variable (Shia, Sunni, and Kurd) and the variable, Intensity of Conflict. In addition, the regression includes those who vote for Shia parties (dummy variable, 1=support for Shi'ite party, 0=support for other parties). I also included ideology (Arab nationalism, Iraqi nationalism, and Islamism; 1=do not support at all/do not support much, 2=neutral, 3=support/strongly support). In order to examine the change before and after the rise of the IS, I included year dummy variables (2011, 2016, and 2017), and the dummy variables for the interaction term of year and the Sunni (2011_Sunni, 2016_Sunni, and 2017_Sunni). The control variables are sex (1=male and 2=female), age, education (1=illiterate, 2=can read, 3=primary school, 4=secondary school, 5=high school, 6=vocational school, 7=university, 8=university graduate, and 9=post-graduate), and income (1=under US$100, 2= US$100–500, 3= US$500–1,000, 4= US$1,000–1,500, 5= US$1,500–2,000, 6=over US$2,000).

The results are shown in Figure 10. Model 1 is a basic model that analyses only the impact of the IS (intensity and year dummy variables). In this model, only the year dummy variables are statistically significant. Model 2 deals with the ethno-sectarian influence (ethno-sectarian dummy variables, interaction terms of the year, and Sunni dummy variables), in addition to the variables of Model 1. I included ideologies in Model 3. Finally, Model 4 deals with all the variables, including the control variables.

【Figure 10: IS Impact on National Integration Overcoming Sectarian Conflict】

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.
Sunni			0.006	0.189	0.053	0.191	0.027	0.203
Shia			0.039	0.108	0.071	0.109	0.136	0.115
Kurd			-1.530 ***	0.117	-1.343 ***	0.120	-1.328 ***	0.125
Intensity	-0.001	0.002	-0.002	0.002	-0.004 **	0.002	-0.004 *	0.002
Vote for Shia Party			0.000	0.099	0.006	0.100	0.039	0.108
Arab Nationalism					0.063	0.052	0.105 *	0.054
Iraq Nationalism					0.528 ***	0.063	0.580 ***	0.068
Islamism					-0.223 ***	0.048	-0.248 ***	0.051
2011	-0.607 ***	0.097	-0.396 ***	0.110	-0.381 ***	0.111	-0.339 ***	0.121
2016	0.283 ***	0.102	0.399 ***	0.115	0.335 ***	0.116	0.361 ***	0.118
2017	0.767 ***	0.103	1.053 ***	0.123	1.025 ***	0.125	1.023 ***	0.133
2011_Sunni			-0.584 **	0.259	-0.651 **	0.262	-0.619 **	0.285
2016_Sunni			-0.077	0.293	0.000	0.296	0.043	0.304
2017_Sunni			-0.684 ***	0.245	-0.691 ***	0.248	-0.699 ***	0.263
Sex							0.072	0.080
Age							-0.002	0.003
Education							-0.014	0.018
Income							0.155 ***	0.041
Cut1	-3.532	0.121	-3.885	0.148	-2.863	0.228	-2.489	0.332
Cut2	-2.602	0.093	-2.924	0.125	-1.881	0.216	-1.420	0.321
Cut3	-1.807	0.081	-2.082	0.116	-1.009	0.212	-0.486	0.319
Cut4	-0.575	0.072	-0.962	0.109	0.348	0.211	0.898	0.319
N	3431		3431		3431		3123	
LR Chi2	192.570		451.650		545.730		536.110	
Pseudo R2	0.028		0.066		0.079		0.086	

* P<0.1 ** P<0.05 ***P<0.01

From the results listed in Model 4 of Figure 10, we can see that the variables Kurd, intensity of conflict, Arab nationalism, Iraq nationalism, Islamism, 2011, 2016, 2017, interaction terms of Sunni and the year 2011, Sunni and the year 2017, and income have a statistically significant relationship with the Iraqi perception of the importance of national integration in overcoming sectarian division.

These results can be more clearly visualised in Figure 11, which shows the effect of the coefficient of each variable. If the coefficients are on the red line, it means the variable is not statistically significant. The horizontal bar shows 95% confidential intervals.

【Figure 11: Significance of Each Coefficient: National Integration】

As indicated in Figure 11, regression reveals that the variable Kurd has a significantly negative relationship with national integration in each model. The intensity of the conflict negatively contributed to the Iraqi perception of national integration overcoming sectarian division. While the perception of Iraqi nationalism has a positive relationship with national integration, Islamism has a significantly negative relationship with it. All dummy variables of the survey years (2011, 2016, and 2017) have a statistically significant relation with the Iraqi perception of the importance of national integration in overcoming sectarian division: the year 2011 has a negative relation, the year 2016 has a positive relation, and the year 2017 has an even more positive relation. As for the interaction terms of the year and Sunni, '2011_Sunni' and '2017_Sunni' negatively affect the national integration perception. In addition, those who have more income are more likely to support national integration.

Simulating the predicted probabilities of important variables provides more insight on the substantive meaning of these results.

First, Kurds are less likely to be supporters of national integration overcoming sectarian conflict. Figure 12, based on Model 4, shows that the probability of Kurds

considering the national integration overcoming sectarian conflict as 'very important', is nearly half as compared to non-Kurds. This is not surprising as Kurds are disinterested in sectarian conflict. Rather, they are keen to solve the various problems between the central government in Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), as well as the problems within the KRG.

【Figure 12: Probability of Kurds and Non-Kurds】

Second, as shown in Figure 13, based on Model 4, the more intensified the conflict, the lower the probability of the respondent considering national integration in overcoming sectarian conflict as 'very important'. On the other hand, the probability of both Shia and non-Shia considering national integration as 'important' increased, as the intensity of the conflict increased. This means that the IS had a negative impact on the Iraqi perception of the national integration overcoming sectarian conflict, in general. Nonetheless, the IS's impact cannot be understood as completely negative as the number of those who considered this polity 'important' increased.

Third, the attitude toward national integration among all Iraqis turned positive, year after year, following the rise of the IS as shown in Figure 14, based on Model 4. This can be understood by the fact that Iraqis came to consider national integration as 'more important', especially after the widespread sectarian conflict caused by the rise of the IS. On the other hand, Figure 14 also indicates that the Sunni considered national integration as 'less important' in 2017 as compared to 2016.

【Figure 13: Probability based on the Intensity of Conflict】

【Figure 14: Change of Probability for those who consider National Integration 'Very Important'】

In summary, the regression reveals that, although the IS generally had a negative impact on national integration, as indicated by the negative relation with the intensity of conflict, the rise of the IS made Iraqis reconsider the importance of national integration overcoming sectarian conflict, as shown in Figure 14. This is, in a sense, the opposite of what we observe in the daily political scene. Nevertheless, the regression proved that this type of reaction against the spread of sectarian conflict as well as a crisis of national division, forced ordinary Iraqis, and not socio-political leaders, to realize the importance of overcoming sectarian conflict.

2. IS Impact on the Negative Attitude toward the Former Regime

This section analyses how Iraqis perceive reconciliation with the supporters of the former regime, before and after the rise of the IS. In other words, based on the pooled data set, I will aim to analyse whether the negative attitude toward the former regime can be understood as an impact of the IS.

The dependent variable is, to what extent do Iraqis give importance to reconciliation with the supporters of the former regime? I will use the answer to the question, to what extent do Iraqis consider the reconciliation important for Iraqi politics, as the variable. As this is an orderly variable (1=not at all important, 2=not important, 3=neutral, 4=important, and 5= very important), it is appropriate to apply the ordered logistic regression model in the analysis.

For the independent variable, I have used the same variables of the former regression model listed in Figure 10. Model 1 to 4 are constructed in the same manner as the previous regression. The results are shown in Figure 15.

As we can see from the results listed in Model 4 of Figure 15, the variables Shia, Kurd, intensity of conflict, vote for Shia party, Arab nationalism, Islamism, 2011, 2016, 2017, interaction terms of Sunni and 2016, sex, and income have a statistically significant relationship with the Iraqi perception of reconciliation with the former regime supporters.

These results are more clearly visualised in Figure 16, which shows the effect of the coefficient of each variable. If the coefficients are on the red line, it means the variable is not statistically significant. The horizontal bar shows 95% confidential intervals.

【Figure 15: Impact on Reconciliation】

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.
Sunni			-0.137	0.159	-0.121	0.161	-0.161	0.169
Shia			-0.545 ***	0.092	-0.423 ***	0.093	-0.423 ***	0.097
Kurd			-0.911 ***	0.107	-0.642 ***	0.111	-0.661 ***	0.115
Intensity	-0.002 **	0.002	-0.008 ***	0.002	-0.008 ***	0.002	-0.008 ***	0.002
Vote for Shia Party			-0.283 ***	0.083	-0.289 ***	0.083	-0.272 ***	0.089
Arab Nationalism					0.519 ***	0.045	0.525 ***	0.047
Iraq Nationalism					-0.074	0.058	-0.089	0.062
Islamism					-0.187 ***	0.041	-0.193 ***	0.043
2011	0.625 ***	0.088	0.695 ***	0.098	0.697 ***	0.099	0.622 ***	0.108
2016	-0.523 ***	0.092	-0.766 ***	0.102	-0.738 ***	0.104	-0.807 ***	0.106
2017	0.169 ***	0.082	0.180 *	0.095	0.180 *	0.096	0.174 *	0.101
2011_Sunni			-0.324	0.239	-0.310	0.241	-0.286	0.265
2016_Sunni			0.763 ***	0.249	0.780 ***	0.253	0.781 ***	0.259
2017_Sunni			-0.017	0.200	0.000	0.201	0.054	0.214
Sex							0.132 *	0.068
Age							-0.002	0.003
Education							0.005	0.015
Income							0.083 **	0.035
Cut1	-1.574	0.071	-2.190	0.102	-1.519	0.192	-1.265	0.281
Cut2	-0.929	0.066	-1.524	0.098	-0.835	0.190	-0.570	0.280
Cut3	0.015	0.064	-0.550	0.095	0.175	0.190	0.420	0.280
Cut4	1.020	0.067	0.480	0.095	1.238	0.192	1.482	0.281
N	3214		3214		3214		2929	
LR Chi2	140.100		271.920		420.320		412.610	
Pseudo R2	0.014		0.027		0.042		0.045	

* P<0.1 ** P<0.05 ***P<0.01

【Figure 16: Significance of Each Coefficient: Reconciliation】

As indicated in Figure 16, the regression reveals that the Shia and Kurds have a significantly negative relationship with reconciliation in each model. The intensity of the conflict negatively contributed to the Iraqi perception of reconciliation. While the Arab nationalism had a positive relation with reconciliation, Islamism showed a significantly negative relationship with it. All dummy variables of the survey year (2011, 2016, and 2017) have a statistically significant relation with the Iraqi perception of the reconciliation; while the years 2011 and 2017 show positive relations, the year 2016 shows a significantly negative relation. As for the interaction terms, '2016_Sunni' positively affected the reconciliation. In addition, men, and those with more income, are more likely to support reconciliation.

Simulating the predicted probabilities of important variables provides more insight on the substantive meaning of these results.

First, the Shia and Kurds are less likely to support reconciliation with the former regime. Figure 17, based on Model 4, shows that the probability of the attitude toward reconciliation became low when one is Shia. This is because a large number of political elites in the former regime were Sunni and a majority of the new regime (Shia) had been

exiled under the former regime.

【Figure 17: Probability of Shia and Non-Shia】

Second, the more intense the conflict, the lower the probability of the respondents supporting reconciliation with the former regime. Figure 18, based on Model 4, shows that the probability to consider the reconciliation 'not at all important' increases as the intensity of the conflict increases, regardless of which sectarian group one may belong to (both Shia and non-Shia in this figure). On the other hand, 23.3% of Shia consider reconciliation 'very important' if the intensity of conflict is at the lowest level, and 9.5% of Shi'a consider the same if the intensity is the highest (roughly 13.8 points decrease). This shows that the attitude toward the former regime was considered to be more severe after the rise of the IS, as alliances were formed with the IS and sectarian conflict was triggered. Although it is not statistically significant, the interaction of intensity and the Sunni dummy variable has the same outcome. This means that the more intense the conflict, the lower the probability of the respondent supporting reconciliation with the former regime. Thus, the IS's impact is considered to be negative toward reconciliation with the former regime.

However, it is very important to note that the crossing point of the probability to reply 'not at all important' and 'very important' is different among ethnic groups (see Figure 18). For the Shia, the probability to reply 'not at all important' exceeds 'very important', when the intensity of the conflict is more than 23 point (see the crossing point

of blue and grey lines in Figure 18). On the other hand, for the non-Shia, the probability to reply 'not at all important' exceeds 'very important', when the intensity of conflict is more than 76 point (see the crossing point of orange and yellow lines in Figure 18). Furthermore, for the Shia, the crossing point for the number of IS-related casualties was around 2300, and for the non-Shia, the crossing point for the number of IS-related casualties was around 7600. This means that the Shia tend to be more negative even during less intense conflict, whereas the non-Shia remain more positive until the intensity increases. In other words, the same IS impact had different meanings within each ethnosectarian group.

【Figure 18: Probability based on the Intensity of Conflict】

Third, the attitude toward reconciliation among all Iraqis and the Sunni reversed after the IS's control, as compared to the attitude before. As shown in Figure 19, the probability that all Iraqis consider reconciliation to be very important after the rise of IS, decreased by half in 2016 (36.7%→15.9%, roughly 20.8 points decrease) and increased again in 2017 (15.9%→28.5%, roughly 12.6 points increase). However, the probability that the Sunni considered reconciliation to be very important increased by more than twofold in 2016 (21.0%→42.7%, roughly 21.7 points increase) and decreased again in 2017 (42.7%→27.0%, roughly 15.7 points decrease). Although not all the variables with regard to the above-mentioned change are statistically significant, the difference in

attitude toward reconciliation among the Sunni and other groups is obvious. All things considered, the Sunni are more likely to consider reconciliation more important in order to overcome the influences of the IS.

【Figure 19: Change of Probability for those who consider the Reconciliation 'Very Important'】

In summary, although the IS had a generally negative impact on reconciliation, as shown by the negative relation to intensity of conflict, the degree of this impact is contextually dependent, differing from on ethno-sectarian group to another. All the discussions relating to Figures 17, 18, and 19 show that the Shia and the Kurds are more sensitive to the influence of the IS, while the Sunni are more resilient to the impact of the IS. The regression reveals that the Sunni are more likely to attempt to overcome its influence especially from a change of attitude to the reconciliation (Figure 19).

Finally, since the number of observations used in Model 4 of the regression listed in Figure 15 is 2929, with 572 missing data (16.34% of the whole dataset), the result might be biased because of this relatively large percentage of missing data (omitted variable bias). Thus, multiple imputation based on the multivariate normal (MVN) of Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) was applied in order to check the result of the original regression[6]. The result of the multiple imputation is shown in Figure 20. In this figure, all variables have a similar coefficient score, significance, and positive/negative

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[6] The multiple imputation analysis was conducted by the Stata (ver.15).

direction. Thus, this proves that the result of the regression shown in Figure 15 is free from omitted variable bias.

【Figure 20: Multiple Imputation: Reconciliation】

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.	Coef.	Std. Err.
Sunni			-0.104	0.159	-0.107	0.161	-0.108	0.161
Shia			-0.526 ***	0.091	-0.418 ***	0.092	-0.401 ***	0.093
Kurd			-0.880 ***	0.105	-0.629 ***	0.110	-0.613 ***	0.110
Intensity	-0.002	0.002	-0.008 ***	0.002	-0.008 ***	0.002	-0.008 ***	0.002
Vote for Shia Party			-0.289 ***	0.084	-0.287 ***	0.085	-0.268 ***	0.085
Arab Nationalism					0.510 ***	0.045	0.515 ***	0.046
Iraq Nationalism					-0.067	0.059	-0.072	0.059
Islamism					-0.187 ***	0.040	-0.182 ***	0.041
2011	0.621 ***	0.087	0.692 ***	0.097	0.698 ***	0.098	0.672 ***	0.101
2016	-0.556 ***	0.091	-0.777 ***	0.101	-0.742 ***	0.103	-0.736 ***	0.103
2017	0.151 *	0.081	0.176 *	0.094	0.170 *	0.094	0.169 *	0.095
2011_Sunni			-0.338	0.238	-0.317	0.240	-0.329	0.240
2016_Sunni			0.766 ***	0.247	0.775 ***	0.252	0.779 ***	0.253
2017_Sunni			-0.037	0.199	-0.007	0.200	0.002	0.200
Sex							0.075	0.064
Age							-0.001	0.003
Education							0.005	0.015
Income							0.076 **	0.035
N	3501		3501		3501		3501	
Average RVI	195.8697		191.3216		189.5387		187.088	
Largest FMI	0.9958		0.9946		0.988		0.9801	
DF min	49.43		49.55		50.24		51.09	
avg	25,800,000		1,418,741		19,231		7,610	
max	3,510,000,000		195,000,000		1,637,264		543,824	
F	37.320		24.670		28.750		22.460	

* P<0.1 ** P<0.05 ***P<0.01

Conclusion

This paper aimed to clarify the impact of the IS conflict in Iraq.

With an overview of the political process and the descriptive statistics of the 2017 poll survey, we observed two widely accepted assumptions: First, the rise of the IS brought about serious sectarian tension and sectarian conflict among Iraqis; Second, the rise of the IS brought about a critically negative perception toward the supporters of the

former regime.

With regard to the first assumption, the rise of the IS made Iraqis reconsider the importance of national integration overcoming sectarian conflict, although the IS had a generally negative impact on national integration as shown in the negative relation to the intensity of conflict. The widespread sectarian conflict and crisis of national division forced ordinary Iraqis to realize the importance of overcoming sectarian conflict.

As for the second assumption, the Shia and the Kurds are more sensitive to the influence of the IS, while the Sunni are more resilient to the impact of the IS. In other words, the degree of these impacts is contextually dependent, differing from one ethno-sectarian group to another, although the IS had a generally negative impact on reconciliation, as shown in the negative relation to the intensity of conflict. The regression reveals that the Sunni are more likely to attempt to overcome the IS's influence especially from a change of attitude to the reconciliation.

In general, the two assumptions – the spread of sectarian conflict and the antipathy toward the former regime – are basically proved as the impact of the IS, in the regression analysis. However, opposite inclinations have also been observed: for the sectarian conflict, considering national integration overcoming sectarian conflict as 'very important' increased after the rise of the IS; as for the reconciliation with the supporters of the former regime, the degree of the impact differs from one ethno-sectarian group to another, with the Sunni being more likely to consider reconciliation in the era of the IS rule. Hence, time period, differences in ethno-sectarian groups, and the intensity of the conflict, all have an important impact on the Iraqi perception of nation and state.

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Appendix

Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
National Integration	3,431	4.436316	0.9715839	1	5
Reconciliation	3,214	3.341319	1.425674	1	5
Sunni	3,501	0.1916595	0.3936628	0	1
Shia	3,501	0.4101685	0.4919344	0	1
Kurd	3,501	0.1573836	0.3642141	0	1
Intensity	3,501	13.71757	19.31803	1	133.13
Vote for Shia Party	3,501	0.2730648	0.4455975	0	1
Arab Nationalism	3,501	2.389889	0.8164036	1	3
Iraq Nationalism	3,501	2.742931	0.6202851	1	3
Islamism	3,501	2.255927	0.8319838	1	3
2011	3,501	0.2002285	0.4002284	0	1
2016	3,501	0.2285061	0.4199303	0	1
2017	3,501	0.2856327	0.4517798	0	1
2011_Sunni	3,501	0.0328478	0.1782635	0	1
2016_Sunni	3,501	0.0322765	0.1767587	0	1
2017_Sunni	3,501	0.0748358	0.2631637	0	1
Sex	3,491	1.488112	0.4999303	1	2
Age	3,436	35.33178	12.87221	16	94
Education	3,492	5.918958	2.381543	1	9
Income	3,223	2.329196	1.104379	1	6